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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Respondent filed her Cross-Appeal after Plaintiff 
appealed the Order on Order to Show Cause issued by the First 
District Court of Box Elder County. Respondent is entitled to 
cross-appeal pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant filed an Order to Show Cause requesting the 
Court to modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the above-
entitled action awarding Defendant custody of the minor 
children of the parties. Plaintiff objected on the basis of 
lack of jurisdiction of the District Court for Box Elder 
County and requested the Court to transfer all matters related 
to custody and visitation to the State of Washington, where 
the children of the parties were residing. The Trial Court 
denied all motions of Plaintiff to transfer jurisdiction and 
proceeded with the Hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause, 
subsequently modifying the Divorce Decree allowing joint 
custody, with Plaintiff maintaining primary physical custody 
of the children. Defendant appealed the Order of the Court 
which was subsequently dismissed for lack of prosecution by 
Defendant. Plaintiff cross-appealed on the basis of 
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jurisdiction and is requesting the Court of Appeals to rule on 
the issue of jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Respondent presents one issue to be determined by the 
Court of Appeals, to-wit: Does the First District Court in 
and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, have jurisdiction 
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
UCA 78-45c-I, et. seq., in order to hear Defendant's request 
to modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the Action. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES, OR REGULATIONS 
The issue raised by Respondent in this Appeal is 
determined soley by the Utah Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, SUPRA, and specifically UCA 78-45c-3 and UCA 
78-45c-7. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
The Action appealed herein is the Trial Court's Order on 
Order to Show Cause dealing with the Defendant's request to 
modify the Decree of Divorce entered in the Action granting 
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Defendant custody of the minor children of the parties. 
2. Course of Proceedings. 
Defendant/ Appellant, Mark Weiner, on or about October 
28, 1985, filed and served on Plaintiff/Respondent an Order to 
Show Cause requesting, among other things, that the Decree of 
Divorce entered in this action be modified to award custody of 
the minor children of the parties to Defendant. Plaintiff, 
by and through counsel, filed a Motion for Change of 
Jurisdiction on or about November 15, 1985. Plaintiff was 
served with the Order to Show Cause on or about December 5, 
1985. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Jurisdiction was denied, 
whereafter Plaintiff filed a Motion to Partially Set Aside the 
Memorandum Decision regarding the Court's decision on 
jurisdiction, which was also denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff 
filed a Petition to Appeal an Interlocutory Order in the 
Supreme Court of Utah, Case No. 860116, which Petition was 
also denied. 
The hearing on Defendant's Order to Show Cause was held 
in the District Court on May 21, 22 and 26, 1986, and the 
Order of the Court was entered Octoher 21, 1986. The copy of 
the Order on Order to Show Cause is attached to 
Plaintiff/Respondent's Docketing Statement. Defendant/ 
Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on or about November 18, 
1986, and Respondent filed a Notice of Cross Appeal on or 
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jurisdiction issue. Defendant's Appeal was dismissed by 
Order of the Honorable Russell W. Bench, Judge, for failure to 
take action as is required by the rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals failing to file a docketing statement and a request 
for transcript of certification and no transcript would be 
requested. 
3. Disposition at Trial Court. 
At the Order to Show Cause Hearing held in the District 
Court on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the trial judge modified 
the Decree of Divorce granting the parties joint custody, 
leaving primary physical custody with Plaintiff and further 
revising and defining visitation and other matters. 
4. Statement of Facts. 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on or about August, 
1974, and divorced on May 18, 1982. Plaintiff was awarded 
custody of the five minor children of the parties pursuant to 
the Decree of Divorce entered in Box Elder County, Civil 
No. 16868, with Defendant being awarded visitation. 
Plaintiff married Mark Rawlings on or about December 23, 
1982. On or about June 1, 1984, Plaintiff and her new 
husband, together with the minor children of the parties, 
moved to Auburn, Washington, in the Seattle area, where 
7 
Mark Rawlings had accepted employment as an engineer with 
Boeing. An Order to Show Cause hearing was held in the Box 
Elder District Court on or about October 23, 1984, to modify 
the Divorce Decree regarding visitation since Defendant could 
no longer exercise weekend visitation rights. The Court's 
Order modifying the Divorce Decree was entered on or about 
December 17, 1984. 
On or about April 19, 1985, a Shelter Care Hearing was 
held in the Superior Court of the State of Washington in and 
for King County, Juvenile Department, No. 85-7-00307, et seq, 
before Court Commissioner Steven M. Gaddis. The Washington 
Court assumed &m&rgency jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (hereinafter "UCCJA") to 
determine allegations of child abuse filed by Plaintiff 
against Defendant. At the Shelter Care hearing, the 
Washington Court noted that it had assumed emergency 
jurisdiction only and that if it appeared that further 
litigation in Washington would be necessary to determine 
custody and visitation matters, the question of jurisdiction 
ne&d&d to be reviewed in order to determine which court, 
Washington or Utah, had proper jurisdiction to hear matters 
relating to care, custody and visitation of the children. The 
Washington Court recommended that Counsel prepare the 
appropriate motions to transfer jurisdiction to Washington and 
indicated that he would confer with the Utah Court on that 
matter. Each of the parties in this action was present at the 
a 
Shelter Care Hearing and subsequent matters in Washington and 
was represented by counsel at all hearings before the 
Washington Court* 
On or about November 15, 1985, Plaintiff filed in the 
Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County, 
No. 85-3-04844-03, her "Motion for Transfer of Jurisdiction 
from Utah to Washington" pursuant to Washington's version of 
the UCCJA. On or about November 15, 1985, Plaintiff's Utah 
attorney filed a "Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Change of Jurisdiction" with the Utah 
Court to assist the Utah Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, in 
making a determination regarding jurisdiction at such time as 
Judge Call would be contacted by the Washington Court to 
confer regarding jurisdiction. 
On or about December 4, 1985, Defendant, acting pro se, 
had served on Plaintiff and filed in the Utah action, among 
other things, a Motion for Order to Show Cause requesting that 
he be awarded by the Utah Court care, custody and control of 
the minor children of the parties. At that time, no 
determination had been made by either Court regarding 
jurisdiction to hear such matters. Immediately thereafter, 
Plaintiff's Utah Counsel formally filed with the Box Elder 
District Court a "Motion for Change of Jurisdiction" pursuant 
to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
Sec. 78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated (hereinafter 
"U.C.A."). By the time the Order to Show Cause had been 
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served on Plaintiff, the children had resided in Washington 
for approximately eighteen <18) months. It had been more than 
thirteen (13) months since the Utah Court had heard any 
matters related to the action, that hearing being related to 
visitation due to the change of residence for the children. 
On or about December 23, 1985, apparently after the 
Washington Court had communicated by telephone with 
Judge Call, the Utah Court, by VeNoy Christoffersen, District 
Judge, entered a Memorandum Decision, a copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
reference, denying Plaintiff's Motion for Change of 
Jurisdiction and stating as the reason for denying Plaintiff's 
Motion for Change of Jurisdiction as, "since Washington has 
declined to take jurisdiction." Thereafter, or on or about 
January 13, 1986, the Washington Court entered its Order 
Declining Jurisdiction, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by reference, stating, 
among other things, "that upon communication with [the Box 
Elder County Court] it [meaning Box Elder] has elected and 
determined to continue exercising sole and exclusive child 
custody jurisdiction." 
Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to partially strike 
the Utah Memorandum Decision of December 23, 1985, indicating 
to Judge Christoffersen an apparent mistake or 
miscommunication in that the only reason Washington had 
declined jurisdiction was because Utah had refused to 
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relinquish jurisdiction, not that Washington did not want to 
exercise jurisdiction, and pointing out to the Court again 
that Utah did not have jurisdiction to hear Defendant's 
request for change of custody. Plaintiff's "Motion to 
Partially Strike Memorandum Decision" was denied by the Court, 
the Honorable Omer J. Call, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen 
concurring, on or about March 1986, again refusing to grant 
Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Jurisdiction. 
The matter came before the Court on May 21, 22, and 
26, 1986 for determination on Defendant's request for change 
of custody. At the beginning of the trial, Plaintiff objected 
to the proceeding based on the Court's lack of jurisdiction, 
which objection was overruled. Plaintiff excepted to the 
Court's refusal to grant the objection, which exception was 
noted by the Court. Plaintiff renewed the objection at 
various times throughout the hearing. Following the hearing, 
the District Court modified the Decree granting Defendant 
joint custody, but leaving physical custody of the children 
with Plaintiff and modifying and reducing visitation. 
The Order on Order to Show Cause was signed by the Court 
on October 21, 1986, whereafter Defendant appealed to the 
Supreme Court and Plaintiff Cross Appealed based on 
jurisdiction. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Plaintiff claims that the District Court had 
no jurisdiction to hear any matters regarding custody of the 
children pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act, Section 78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, in that 
the children of the parties had been out of the State of Utah 
almost two years by the time of the hearing held on May 21, 
22, and 26, 1986, and because Utah is an inconvenient forum. 
Because the District Court has no jurisdiction, any subsequent 
Order of the Court should be set aside with an Order directing 




WASHINGTON HAS BEEN AND IS READY, WILLING AND ABLE 
TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
MATTERS IN THIS ACTION AND IS THE ONLY PROPER STATE 
TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER CUSTODY AND VISITATION 
The Superior Court for King County, State of Washington, 
assumed temporary emergency jurisdiction over this matter in 
the State of Washington in or about March, 1985. A Shelter 
Care hearing was held on or about April 19, 1985, wherein the 
Washington Court, by and through th£ Honorable Stephen M. 
Gaddis, Commissioner, addressed the issue of jurisdiction 
between Washington and Utah, among other things. Commissioner 
Gaddis stated at the beginning of the hearing that it was his 
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opinion that jurisdiction was in Utah until jurisdiction could 
be transferred to Washington. Commissioner Gaddis also 
indicated, however, that if there were a likelihood of 
continued litigation, it was best to have the litigation in 
one forum. Commissioner Gaddis stated: 
... If it is likely that there is going to be 
ongoing litigation after that point, there is 
certain value of having everything happen --
well, there is always a value of having it 
happen in one forum, and ordinarily you want 
the forum to be in the area where the most 
witnesses are, where the least financial 
expense is, and these kind of things would 
favor a Washington forum...I don't think 
this family can afford to keep travelling to 
Utah, and I am pursuaded the father cannot afford 
to keep coming to Washington, hiring Washington 
counsel and Utah counsel, so I think there is a 
likelihood of continued litigation here and the 
forum question really ought to be addressed and 
I would intend to call the Utah judge to see 
exactly what is happening there. And I would 
intend to give each of the attorneys an 
opportunity to make a presentation before there 
is any kind of substantive decision on that. 
But, we have got to keep expenses down -- I mean 
the poor families are suffering emotionally, as 
well as financially. I respect that. (Transcript, 
pp 16-17) 
In Commissioner Gaddis' Order Declining Jurisdiction, it 
should be noted that the reason the Washington Court declined 
jurisdiction and denied Plaintiff's Motion in Washington for 
Change of Jurisdiction was that the Utah Court "refused to 
relinquish jurisdiction11 (emphasis added) and the Washington 
Court felt, pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act, that it did not have the authority to assume jurisdiction 
unless or until jurisdiction was released by Utah. In a 
Clarification Order entered by Commissioner Gaddis, the 
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Washington Court again stated that it would be willing to 
entertain jurisdiction should the Utah Court wish to transfer 
jurisdiction. It should be noted that Plaintiff is not 
requesting the Utah Court to completely divulge itself of 
jurisdiction over the entire divorce case. Plaintiff is 
merely requesting the Utah Court to defer jurisdiction over 
custody and visitation matters to the Washington Court and 
allow the Washington Court to entertain any such motions to 
modify the Decree. Of course, the Washington Court is aware 
of the procedings in Utah and is cognizant of the orders 
previously entered in this matter and can make determinations 
of future matters taking into account the orders entered in 
Utah and granting those orders full faith and credit as if 
they had been originally entered in Washington. 
It should also be noted that there is a distinct 
difference between having jurisdiction and exercising 
jurisdiction. In the instant action, both Utah and Washington 
have jurisdiction. However, it is important to determine 
which of the two Courts should exercise jurisdiction or if 
jurisdiction can be exercised concurrently. An example is the 
case of Etter v. Etter, 405 A.2d 760 (Ct. of Sp. Ap., 1979). 
In that case, the Maryland Court was asked to determine 
custody of a child who had resided in Delaware with his father 
and had come to Maryland asking to stay in Maryland with his 
mother. At that time there was no divorce decree and each of 
the parties had filed for custody. The Maryland Trial Court 
ruled that both States had jurisdiction over the matter but 
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that the evidence clearly established that it was for the best 
interest of the boy involved to be with his mother* Both 
Maryland and Delaware had adopted the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act and the Maryland Court of Appeals noted that 
the language in the Act did not divest one court of 
jurisdiction once jurisdiction had been found in another 
State. The Act deals with guiding the courts of the two 
States involved and working out which is the appropriate court 
to exercise jurisdiction. 
The difference between the exercise of jurisdiction and 
having jurisdiction is also apparent not only from the 
statutes but on examination of the decision in Greene v. 
Greene, 276 N. W. 2d 472 (Mich. App. 1978). Therein the 
Michigan Court of Appeals pointed out that the two district 
court judges involved in Texas and Michigan had called and 
spoken with each other in an effort to determine which State 
should properly exercise jurisdiction. After they had 
determined that Michigan should exercise its concurrent 
jurisdiction to modify the decree, it took evidence and did 
so. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court determined 
that under those circumstances, applying the same provisions 
in the UCCJA as raised in this action, the Michigan court 
properly exercised jurisdiction to determine the case. 
Most of the cases interpreting the UCCJA have been 
incidents were one parent has abducted the children and 
secreted them from the other parent and then attempted to 
modify a custody decree of another state months or years 
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later. Although not directly on point, since in the 
instant action there has never been an incidence of abduction 
and all matters of custody and visitation have been handled 
properly through the Courts, the cases do offer some insight 
into the intent and purpose of the UCCJA and may be of 
assistance to this Court in rendering a decision. 
For example, in the case Settle vs. Settle, 556 P.2d 962 
(Or., 1976), the mother was attempting to modify in Oregon a 
custody decree which was entered in Indiana. The decree was 
originally entered, in the mother's absence after she had left 
Indiana with the children. However, the action had been 
commenced prior to the mother's leaving Indiana for Oregon. 
The trial court had originally allowed jurisdiction and 
modified the custody decree. The Oregon Appeals Court then 
overturned the trial court and the Appeals Court was 
subsequently overturned by the Oregon Supreme Court, 
reinstating the decision of the trial court that jurisdiction 
was proper in Oregon. 
In determining whether Oregon had jurisdiction to modify 
the decree, the Supreme Court of Oregon followed a two tiered 
determination, first determining if jurisdiction were proper 
in Oregon and then determining if jurisdiction should be 
maintained by Oregon. As noted by the Court, the two main 
factors for determining jurisdiction as mentioned in the UCCJA 
are: (1) If the state is the home state of the children at 
the time of commencement of the action, or (2) If it is in 
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the best interest of the child that the court assumes 
jurisdiction because the child and at least one contestant 
have a significant connection with the state and there is 
available in the state potential evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships. 
The Oregon Court determined that the necessary 
threshholds had been met to establish jurisdiction since the 
children had been in Oregon for at least six (6) consecutive 
months prior to the commencement of the proceedings and hence, 
Oregon was the children's home state. In determining whether 
the Court should exercise its jurisdiction, the Court noted, 
in reference to the second tier of the test, the "significant 
connection test" that: 
One parent [the father] certainly has a significant 
connection with Indiana, and there is available 
there substantial evidence concerning the 
children's relationship with that parent and, 
thus, the future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships if they are to be 
returned to Indiana. However, at the time 
of the hearing by the trial court the children 
had no significant connection with Indiana because 
of the length of time they had been away. In the 
lives of children four and eight years of age, 
eighteen months is a long time. 556 P.2d at 966. 
It should be noted that in the instant action, the 
children had resided in Washington almost two years by the 
time of hearing held on May 21, 1986. 
The Oregon Supreme Court also reviewed the Commissioner's 
Note, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 107, 108, Section 3 (Master Ed. 
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1973), dealing with the UCCJA which contained the following: 
Paragraph <2) Cthe significant connection test] perhaps 
more than any other provision of the Act requires 
that it be interpreted in the spirit of the 
legislative purposes expressed in section 1. 
The paragraph was phrased in general terms in 
order to be flexible enough to cover many fact 
situations too diverse to lend themselves to 
exact description. But its purpose is to limit 
jurisdiction rather than proliferate it* The 
first clause of the paragraph is important: 
Jurisdiction exists only if it is in the 
child's interest, not merely the interest or 
convenience of the fueding parties, to determine 
custody in the particular state. The interest of 
the child is served when the forum has optimum 
access to relevant evidence of the child and 
family. There must be maximum rather than minimum 
contact with the State. The submission of the 
parties to a forum, perhaps for purposes of divorce, 
is not sufficient without additional factors 
establishing closer ties with the State. Divorce 
jurisdiction does not necessarily include custody 
jurisdiction. See Clark, Domestic Relations 578 
(1968) (emphasis in original) 556 P.2d at 966. 
The Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that the 
significant connection test, which includes an examination of 
the best interests of the children, was one of the most 
important factors in determining whether Oregon should 
exercise its jurisdiction. The Court also noted that the 
Commissioners Note comment indicated that the requirement of 
the availability of "substantial evidence" should be 
understood to require optimum access to relevant evidence. 
The Court determined that since the children had been in 
Oregon for eighteen months, Indiana no longer had optimum 
access to relevant evidence. 
It should also be noted that even though the court where 
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the divorce decree and custody determination were originally 
entered is the original court of jurisdiction, there are some 
occasions when the court of original jurisdiction either 
should not exercise its jurisdiction or has lost its 
jurisdiction. In McCarron v. Dist. Crt. in and for Jefferson 
Cty. , 671 P. 2d 953 (Col. 1983), the father and mother were 
married in 1974 in New Jersey. On July 1, 1976, a divorce 
decree was granted upon the mother's petition by an Oklahoma 
District Court and she was awarded the custody of the parties 
child. The father later moved from New Jersey to Colorado in 
1981 where the son made several visits to his father and 
eventually in August, 1982, it was decided that the son would 
be entered in school in Colorado. The mother thereafter moved 
to Texas and in May, 1983, or approximately nine months after 
the son had been with his father, the mother removed the child 
from school without the father's knowledge or consent and took 
the child to Texas. The father thereafter immediately filed 
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and a verified petition for 
custody pursuant to the Colorado provisions of the UCCJA. The 
Colorado court then conferred with the Oklahoma court 
whereupon the Oklahoma judge stated that he would retain 
jurisdiction on issues of custody, support and visitation. 
Based on the Oklahoma court's statement, the Colorado court 
declined jurisdiction. 
On an appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the Court 
noted, as had the Oregon Supreme Court, the two distinct 
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inquiries which should be made in order to determine whether a 
Colorado district court should hear a child custody case under 
the UCCJA. The first is whether jurisdiction exists in the 
state and the second is whether the state should exercise its 
jurisdiction. The Colorado Supreme Court determined that 
jurisdiction did exist since the child had lived in Colorado 
for more than six months and Colorado had become the child's 
home state. 
In determining whether jurisdiction should be exercised, 
the Colorado Supreme Court stated that before modifying a 
decree of another state, the Colorado court must find either 
that <i) the original state no longer has jurisdiction or (2) 
that the other state has declined to assume jurisdiction. In 
that case, of course, the second criteria was not applicable 
because Oklahoma had said that it desired to retain 
jurisdiction. In determining if Oklahoma still had 
jurisdiction, the Colorado court noted that the provisions of 
the UCCJA state that the original state shall have continuing 
jurisdiction as long as it is excerising jurisdiction 
substantially in conformance with the UCCJA. The court noted 
that original jurisdiction could be lost by the erosion of 
child and parent significant connections with the state. 
In holding that Colorado should properly exercise its 
jurisdiction and that Oklahoma no longer had jurisdiction, the 
Colorado Supreme Court stated that: 
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...We must keep in mind the other policies of the 
Act, namely, that litigation concerning the child take 
place in the state with which the child and his 
family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning the child is 
available. Clearly, the best interest of the 
child would not be served through the exercise 
of jurisdiction by Oklahoma in this case. The 
child has not resided in that state for nine 
months at the time the father filed the petition 
and neither the parents nor the child now live 
there. 
We hold that the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
Colorado court is appropiate because Oklahoma 
no longer has jurisdiction. The district court 
abused its discretion by deferring to the 
jurisdiction of the Oklahoma court. We therefore 
make the rule absolute. 671 P.2d at 957, 958. 
In another Colorado case, In Re Custody of Dunn, 701 P.2d 
158 <Colo. App., 1985), the Colorado Appeals Court held that 
where the natural parents of a child were divorced by a Texas 
decree but the child, after the death of his father, had lived 
with his stepmother for six months in Colorado prior to the 
filing by the stepmother of a petition for custody, and that 
the child and stepmother had significant connections with 
Colorado, Colorado had jurisdiction as the home state of the 
child, and Texas, under its version of the UCCJA, did not have 
home state jurisdiction nor significant connection 
jurisdiction, and therefore Texas no longer had jurisdiction 
and the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to 
exercise jurisdiction. 
In the Dunn case, the parents had separated and the 
mother and son had moved to Texas. In March of 1980, the 
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mother permitted the son to travel to California for an 
overnight visit with his father. The father did not return 
the child to Texas and the son stayed with the father and his 
father's girlfriend. In September of 1980, the mother 
obtained a divorce decree in Texas in which she was awarded 
custody. However, the child continued to reside with his 
father. The father and his girlfriend were married in 1981. 
The father was killed in an automobile accident in 1983, 
whereafter the stepmother and the son moved to Colorado. 
After being in Colorado for six months, the stepmother filed a 
petition seeking custody of the son. The trial court 
determined that it had home state jurisdiction because the 
child had resided in Colorado for six months and because the 
ties to Colorado made it in the best interest of the child for 
Colorado to assume jurisdiction. However, the trial court 
communicated with the Texas court of original jurisdiction and 
was advised by the Texas court that it felt it still had 
jurisdiction to consider any modifications of its custody 
order. The Colorado court thereafter ruled that it was 
precluded from modifying the Texas decree because Texas still 
had jurisdiction. 
On appeal, the Appellate Court ruled that the trial court 
had correctly determined that because the child and stepmother 
had significant connections with Colorado, and because there 
was substantial evidence concerning the child in Colorado, it 
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was in the best interest for Colorado to assume jurisdiction. 
However, the Appellate Court did not agree with the trial 
court in ruling that Texas still had jurisdiction. The Court 
noted the provisions of the Texas version of the UCCJA which 
are similiar to Section 78-45-3, UCA, particularly noting a 
provision in the Texas Act that states: "If it appears that 
no other state would have jurisidiction under Subdivision (1) 
of subdivision (a) of this section." That provision is 
similar to Section 78-45-3<d) of the Utah Act. The Court then 
stated: 
Under the Texas statute, because the child did 
not live in Texas at anytime during the six 
months prior to commencement of the Colorado 
custody proceedings, it is not entitled to 
jurisdiction under the "home state" provision 
of the [Texas Act]. Further it does not appear 
that Texas had jurisdiction under...the 
"significant connection" provision, because 
unlike the comparable Colorado statute 
[citation omitted] the Texas statute does not 
permit "significant connection" jurisdiction 
where another state has "home state" 
jurisdiction..., and here, Colorado has 
such jurisdiction. In addition, the child's 
contact with Texas has become slight, and 
substantial evidence concerning his welfare 
is present here: thus, modification of 
jurisdiction should shift to Colorado. 
The Court concluded by noting with dissatisfaction 
earlier cases which held that the court which enters the 
original custody order will always have jurisdiction, and 
stating that such rulings were overly broad and overlooked the 
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intent and purpose of the UCCJA and that under certain 
circumstances the state of original jurisdiction can and 
should lose jurisdiction. 
Plaintiff has been unable to find a Utah case on point 
dealing with jurisdiction for custody modification under the 
UCCJA. However, in McLane vs. McLane, 570 P.2d 692, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that notwithstanding that courts of one 
state have acquired original jurisdiction over children, such 
as by way of custody awards on divorce, a judgment that had 
been entered therein does not mean that the original state 
retains permanent and exclusive control over them. The Utah 
Supreme Court noted the need of children for sustenance and 
protective care is continuous and, hence, properly interested 
parties may invoke the jurisdiction of a court based on either 
the domicile of the child, the presence of the child within 
the state or in personam jurisdiction over the parties seeking 
custody, and any one of those would be sufficient foundation 
for the court to hear and determine the controversy. In other 
words, the Supreme Court of Utah has recognized, similar to 
the rulings in McCarron and Dunn, that original jurisdiction 
is not in and of itself sufficient to allow a state to retain 
permanent jurisdiction indefinitely. 
In the instant action, the original decree was entered in 
1982 in Utah. The children moved to Washington with their 
mother and stepfather in June of 1984 and have continuously 
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resided in the State of Washington since June, 1984P which is 
currently more than three years and was a period of almost two 
years at the time the hearing, which was held on May 21, 22 
and 26, 1986. The family moved to Washington so that the 
stepfather could accept employment with Boeing* The move to 
Washington was not an attempt to in a:r :iy way sidestep the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court. 
In short, Utah simply has no significant connections, 
other than the Defenda n t * s presence i i i 1 11 a 1 :t, i n o i d e i t o 
exercise jurisdiction. Utah has neither "home state" 
jurisdiction nor "significant connection" jursidiction as 
outlined in the Dui n i case. On the othei hand, the State of 
Washington is the childrens' home state since they have 
resided there for more than six months and Washington has 
numerous, and has the most substantial and significant 
connections with all of the parties in this action, including 
the Defendant, who has been involved in several hearings in 
Washington and has been represented by an attorney in 
Washington actions. Furthermore the "substantial evidence" 
that would be necessar y t o properly hear a custody 
determination is found only in the State of Washington. It is 
clearly in the best interest of the children for jurisdiction 
to be maintained only in the Sta te of Washington. And,, as 
stated in the UCCJA, it is the best interest of the children 
which is controlling and not the interests of the parties to 
the action nor the interests of the Court. In fact, the 
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purpose and intent of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act dictate that Utah defer jurisdiction to Washington for 
custody and visitation matters and allow the Washington Court 
to make a determination on any such matters. 
II 
WASHINGTON IS THE MOST CONVENIENT 
FORUM TO DETERMINE ISSUES REGARDING 
CUSTODY AND VISITATION OF THE CHILDREN 
In addition to the requirements which must be met in 
order for District Court in this State to exercise 
jurisdiction (as outlined in UCA 78-45c-3and previoulsy 
discussed), Section 78-45c-7 of the Act lists several factors 
which should be considered by the Court in deciding whether to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of forum nonconveniens: 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient 
forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest 
of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. 
For this purpose it may take into account the following 
factors, among others: 
<a) If another state is, or recently was, the 
child's home state? 
<b) If another state has a closer connection with 
the child and his family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the child's 
present or future care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships is more readily available in 
another state; 
<d) If the parties have agreed on another forum 
which is no less appropriate; and 
<e) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any purposes stated in 
Section 78-45c-l. 
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In conjunction with those considerations, of the purposes 
listed in the beginning of the Act, of greatest importance are 
the following found in Section 78-45c-l: 
<c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody 
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with which 
the child and his family have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning his care, 
protection, training, and personal relationships as most 
readily available, and as Courts of this state decline 
the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his 
family have a closer connection with another state; 
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over child 
custody in the interest of greater stability of home 
environment and of secure family relationships for the 
child. 
In reviewing the factors listed in Subsection 7 of the 
Act 978-45c-7) and applying those I: o I: he s t a teci p 1 ir poses of 
the Act found in Subsection 1 <78-45c-l), it is clear that, in 
the instant action, the State of Washington is far and above 
the most convenient forum. As previously stated, those 
factors include: 
1. Washington is the children's home state, it was 
the children's home state for nearly 2 years at the time 
the hearing was held in May of 1986, and has now been the 
children's home state in excess of 3 years. <As stated 
earlier, the children moved to Washington in June of 
1984). 
2. Ihe only connection Utah has with the children 
is their father and maternal grandparents. All other 
connections are found in Washington, eg. friends, 
neighbors, school teachers, principals, ecclesiastical 
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leaders, doctors, therapists, psychologists, etc. 
3. Any evidence, except as may be provided by the 
children's father, concerning the children's present and 
future care, protection, training and personal 
relationships is more readily available in Washington. 
4. The exercise of jurisdiction by the District 
Court in this action seriously contravenes the purposes 
stated in the Act. One purpose of the Act is to assure 
that litigation concerning the custody of a child take 
place ordinarily in the State with which the child and 
his family have the closest connection and where 
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, 
training, and personal relationships as most readily 
available and that the COURTS OF THIS STATE [SHOULD] 
DECLINE THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION WHEN THE CHILD AND 
HIS FAMILY HAVE A CLOSER CONNECTION WITH ANOTHER STATE. 
U.C.A. Section 78-45C-Kc) (emphasis added). Another 
major purpose is to discourage continuing controversy 
over child custody in the interest of greater stability 
of home environment and of secure family relationships 
with the child. Prior to the hearing upon which this 
appeal is based, the parties have appeared in Court on 
various matters in excess of 12 times. In addition, even 
after this appeal had been filed, the Defendant has filed 
a petition to modify the Divorce Decree again requesting 
custody of the children. As can be seen, the purposes of 
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the Act are not being met by allowing the District Court 
to maintain jurisdiction over this action. 
Plaintiff readily admits that the trial court should be 
granted great latitude when applying the factors indicated in 
Subsection 7 of the Act to determine if jurisdiction should be 
exercised on the basis of convenience. In this action, 
however, the Trial Court has greatly abused its discretion by 
failing to properly apply the factors stated i n t he Act to the 
facts of the instant action and by failing to follow the 
general purpose as stated in the Act Tn contrast to the 
ruling of the Supreme Court of • - ^ • I ^ 
ADV. REP. 30, Plaintiff has shown that the interest of the 
children would be better served by relinquishing jurisdiction 
to Washington and that it is severely prejudicial to both 
Plaintiff and the children to refuse to do so. Plaintiff has 
further shown that all necessary and relevant evidence 
concerning custody matters can be found only in Washington. 
It should be further noted that even though the Trial 
Court has discretion in applying the factors stated in 
Subsection 7 of the Act in determining jurisdictional matters, 
the Trial Court does not have dicretion to determine if the 
Court has jurisdiction as required in Subsection 3 of the 
Act. The Act requires that specific conditions be met in 
order for this Court to maintain jurisdiction. Those 
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conditions include (See LLC,A. Section 78-45c-l<a) (b) <c> and 
<d>. (a) if this state is the home state of the child; <b) the 
best interest of the child and the child has significant 
connections with the state? (c) the physical presence of the 
child in the state? id) if no other state has jurisdiction. 
The State of Utah simply does not meet any of those criteria 
as stated in the Act. Washington, and not Utah, is the home 
state of the children. Washington, and not Utah, has the most 
substantial connections with the children. In fact, Utah's 
connections with the children are relatively insignificant and 
there is no evidence, let alone substantial evidence, 
concerning the children's care, protection, training and 
personal relationships. Furthermore, none of the children is 
present in this state and it is absolutely clear that 
Washington does have grounds to exercise jurisdiction. 
Therefore, even if this Court were to conclude that the Trial 
Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to properly 
consider the factors in determining whether to exercise 
jurisdiction, this Court must conclude that the basis 
necessary for the District Court to exercise jurisdiction in 
this action have not been met and that the District Court 
simply no longer has jurisdiction over the children. 
It must also be noted that the Honorable Omer J. Call, 
the District Court Judge who has heard all matters relative to 
this action in Utah, has retired effective July 31, 1987, and 
will no longer hear any matters relative hereto, further 
weakening any claim by Defendant or the District Court that 
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jurisdiction be maintained in Utah since the trial judge who 
is familiar with the case will no longer be sitting on the 
case. Thus, a judge in Washinton is as well qualified and as 
familiar with the case, if not more familiar with the case 
because of the Shelter Care Hearings in Washington, than the 
new judge appointed in the Utah First District. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Court's refusal to grant Plaintiff's Motion for 
Change of Jurisdiction and subsequent refusal tu qrant 
Plaintiff's objections to jurisdiction at the time of the 
hearing is manifest error in that the Utah District Court 
clearly had no jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody, 
visitation or other matters relevant to the children. Such 
matters can be and should be determined only by the Superior 
Court in Washington where the children currently reside and 
have been residing now for several years. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
Order setting aside the Order on Order to Show Cause entered 
by the Court on or about October 21, 1986, for lack of 
jurisdiction and further ordering this Court to defer any 
matters relevant to custody, visitation and other matters 
relative to the children to the Washington Superior Court. 
DATED this _£_.!_ day of August, 1987. 
St;epkj&iY W. J e w e l l 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLANT to Mark Weiner, Pro Se, 
665 South 700 West, Brigham City, Utah 84302 and deposited 
the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid envelope this 
2-1* day of August, 1987. 
^A^id^p- J^J<L04<J(^- VUUAISLLI 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Copy of Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 
UCA 78-45c-l, et. seq. 
2. Copy of December 23, 1985 Memorandum Decision from 
Judge Christoffersen. 
3. Copy of Washington Court's Order Declining 
Jurisdiction. 
4. Copy of the Order on Order to Show Cause dated 
October 21, 1986. 
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78-45b-17.i. Judicial Code 
become subject to a collection action to satisfy the 
support debt. i*>s 
Tt-45b-17.l. Pasting or bond or security for 
payment of support debt. 
OKa) The department shall, or an obligee may, 
petition the court for an order requiring an obligor 
to post a bond or provide other security for the 
payment of a support debt, when the department or 
an obligee determines that action is appropriate, if 
the payments are more than 90 days delinquent. The 
department shall establish rules for determining 
when it shall seek an order for security. 
(b) For purposes of this section, 'support debt" 
includes court ordered obligations for the support of 
a spouse or former spouse with whom the child 
resides, if that support is collected with the child 
support. 
(2) When the department or an obligee petitions 
ibe court under this section, it shall give written 
notice to the obligor, stating: 
(a) the amount of support debt; 
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order 
requiring the obligor to post security; and 
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear 
before the court and contest the department's or 
obligee's petition. 
(3) After notice to the obligor and an opportunity 
for a hearing, the court shall order a bond posted or 
other security to be deposited upon the depart-
ment's or obligee's showing of a support debt and 
of a reasonable basis for the security. IMS 
Tt-45b-lS. Extensions of time for good cause 
authorized - Service of docuameaU. 
(1) Whenever, for good cause, it appears that an 
extension of time should be given in relation to any 
proceedings under this act, the same shall be 
granted. 
(2) The manner provided for service of any doc-
uments under this act shall be in addition to other 
manners of service provided by law. wis 
7t-45b-19. Actions Involving orders prohibited 
unless ptaaatJlf applies to departaacat for bearing. 
No action, proceeding, or suit to set aside, vacate, 
or amend an order issued under this chapter, may 
be brought unless the plaintiff first applies to the 
department for a hearing on every issue to be pres-
ented in the action, proceeding, or suit. MM 
7S-45b-20. Conflict of orders. 
If any order pursuant to this act is, or becomes, 
in conflict with any order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, to the extent of such conflict the court 
order shall govern. wn 
7S-4Sb-21. Charge off of uacollectibk support 
debts. 
The department may charge off as uncollectible 
any support debt upon which it finds there is no 
available, practical and lawful means by which that 
debt may be collected and may transfer those acco-
unts from accounts receivable to a suspense account 
and cease to account for them as assets. ins 
7t-4Sb-22. Repealed. IMS 
7S-45b-23. Medical and dental expenses of 
dependent children • Assigning respousibUity for 
paysaeat - Insurance coverage provtsloa la 
order. 
In any action under this chapter the department 
or the administrative hearing examiner shall include 
in its order a provision assigning responsibility for 
the payment of reasonable and necessary medical 
and dental expenses of the dependent children. If 
coverage is available at a reasonable cost, the dep-
artment or the examiner may also include a provi-
sion requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insur-
ance for (hose children. ifU 
7S-45b-24. Provision of support debt information 
to consumer reporting agency. 
(1) As used in this section, "consumer reporting 
agency" means any person who, for monetary fees, 
dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly 
assembles or evaluates consumer credit information 
bearing on credit worthiness, standing or capacity, 
for the purpose of furnishing consumer credit 
reports to third parties. 
(2) The department shall supply information reg-
arding a support debt in excess of $1,000 to any 
consumer reporting agency only upon its request. 
(3) The department may supply information reg-
arding a support debt of $1,000 or less to a cons-
umer reporting agency only upon its request. 
(4) Before it supplies any information to a cons-
umer reporting agency under this section, the dep-
artment shall give written notice to the obligor, 
specifying the information which will be disclosed to 
the consumer reporting agency and providing the 
obligor with a reasonable opportunity to contest the 
accuracy of the information in an administrative 
bearing. 
(5) The department shall establish rules impleme-
nting this section. 
(6) The department may charge the consumer 
reporting agency a fee for furnishing information 
under this section. That fee may not exceed the 
department's actual cost of providing the informa-
tion. 
(7) The notice provisions of this section do not 
apply to a support debt which has been reduced to 
judgment and is public information. mt 
7S-45b-25. Information received from State Tax 
Commission to be provided to other states' 
collection agencies. 
The Office of Recovery Services shall, upon 
request, provide to any other state's child support 
collection agency the information which it receives 
from the State Tax Commission under Subsection 59-
10-545(2), with regard to a support debt which 
that agency is involved in enforcing. mt 
Chapter 45c. Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction 
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7s-4Sc-22. ReqnestlBg coart records frees aaother state. 
7M5C-23. Foreiga coaatrlcs - AppNcadoo of geaeral 
TMSc-24. Priority oa coart caleadar. 
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7»-45c-24. Short title. 
7*-45c-l. Purposes - Coastrvctioa. 
(1) The general purposes of this act are to: I 
(a) Avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict I 
with courts of other states in matters of child I 
custody which have in the past resulted in the shif-
ting of children from state to state with harmful 
effects on their well-being; 
(b) Promote cooperation with the courts of I 
other states to the end that a custody decree is ren-
dered in that state which can best decide the case in 
the interest of the child; 
(c) Assure that litigation concerning the custody I 
of a child take place ordinarily in the state with I 
which the child and his family have the closest j 
connection and where significant evidence concer- I 
ning his care, protection, training, and personal I 
relationships is most readily available, and that I 
courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdic- I 
hon when the child and his family have a closer I 
connection with another state; [ 
(d) Discourage continuing controversies over I 
child custody in the interest of greater stability of I 
home environment and of secure family relations-
hips for the child; 
(e) Deter abductions and other unilateral rem- I 
ovals of children undertaken to obtain custody I 
•wards; 
( 0 Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of I 
other states in this state insofar as feasible; I 
(g) Facilitate the enforcement of custody I 
decrees of other states; I 
(h) Promote and expand the exchange of info- I 
hnation and other forms of mutual assistance I 
between the courts of this state and those of other I 
"ales concerned with the same child; and I 
(i) To make uniform the law of those states I 
*Wch enact it. I 
(2) This title shall be construed to promote the I 
•"•eral purposes stated in this section. MM I 
*-4Sc-2. Definitions. 
As used in this act: I 
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a I 
jtocm, who claims a right to custody or visitation I 
>VHs with respect to a child; I 
(2) "Custody determination' means a court deci- I 
sion and court orders and instructions providing for 
the custody of a child, including visitation rights; n 
does not include a decision relating to child support 
or any other monetary obligation of any person; 
(3) "Custody proceeding* includes proceedings in 
which a custody determination is one of several 
issues, such as an action for dissolution of marriage, 
or legal separation, and includes child neglect and 
dependency proceedings; 
(4) 'Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody 
determination contained in a judicial decree or order 
made in a custody proceeding, and includes aa 
initial decree and a modification decree; 
(5) "Home state" means the state in which the 
child immediately preceding the time involved lived 
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as 
parent, for at least six consecutive months, and is 
the case of a child less than six months old the state 
in which the child lived from birth with any of the 
persons mentioned. Periods of temporary absence of 
any of the named persons are counted as part of the 
six-month or other period; 
(6) "Initial decree" means the first custody decree 
concerning a particular child; 
(7) "Modification decree" means a custody decree 
which modifies or replaces a prior decree, whether 
made by the court which rendered the prior decree 
or by another court; 
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession 
and control of a child; 
(9) "Person acting as parent* means a person, 
other than a parent, who has physical custody of a 
child and who has either been awarded custody by 
the court or claims a right to custody; and 
(10) "State" means any state, territory or posses-
sion of the United States, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. tsas 
7S-45c-3. Bases of jarisdictJoa M this state. 
(1) A court of this state which is competent to 
decide child custody matters has jurisdiction to 
make a child custody determination by initial or 
modification decree if the conditions as set forth ia 
any of the following paragraphs are met: 
(a) This state (i) is the home state of the child 
at the time of commencement of the proceeding, or 
(it) had been the chad's home state within sn 
months before commencement of the proceeding 
and the child is absent from this state because of his 
removal or retention by a person claiming his 
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or person 
acting as parent continues to live in this state; 
(b) It is in the best interest of the child that a 
court of this state assume jurisdiction because (i) the 
child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with this 
state, and (ii) there is available in this state substa-
ntial evidence concerning the child's present or 
future care, protection, training, and personal rela-
tionships; 
(c) The child is physically present in this state 
and (i) the child has been abandoned or (ii) U is 
necessary in an emergency to protect the child 
because he has been subjected to or threatened wish 
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected or 
dependent; or 
(dX«) It appears that no other state would have 
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in acc-
ordance with paragraphs (a), (b), or (c), or another 
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that this state is the more appropriate forum 
to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is « 
the best interest of the child that this court assume 
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7<-45c-4. Judicial 
jurisdiction. I 
(2) Except wider paragraphs (c) and (d) of subs- I 
ection (I), physical presence in this sute of the I 
child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is I 
not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a court I 
of this state to aaake a child custody determination. I 
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, 
is not a prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his I 
custody. MM I 
7M5c-4. Peranas to be notified and heard. 
Before making a decree under this act, reasonable I 
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to I 
the contestants, any parent whose parental rights I 
have not bean previously terminated, and any I 
person who has physical custody of the child If any I 
of these persons is outside this state, notice and I 
opportunity an be heard shall be given pursuant to I 
section 78-45o5. MM 
78-4SC-S. Sendee of notice outside state - Proof 
of service - Shwaalscioa to jnrisdictfoa. 
(1) Notice acquired for the exercise of jurisdiction I 
over a person outside this state shall be given in a I 
manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, I 
and may be naade in any of the following ways: I 
(a) By personal delivery outside this state in the I 
manner prescribed for service of process within this I 
state; I 
(b) In the manner prescribed by the law of the I 
place in which the service is made for service of I 
process in that place in an action in any of its courts I 
of general jurisdiction; I 
(c) By assy form of mail addressed to the person I 
IO he served ami requesting a receipt; or J 
(d) As detected by the court (including public- I 
ation, if other means of notification are ineffective). I 
(2) Notice under this section shall be served, I 
mailed, delivered, or last published at least 10 days 
before any hearing in this state. I 
(3) Proof of service outside this state may be 
made by affidavit of the individual who made the I 
service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of I 
this state, the order pursuant to which the service is I 
made, or the law of the place in which the service is I 
made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a 1 
receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of J 
delivery to the addressee. J 
(4) Notice k not required if a person submits to I 
the juriidkaien of the court. ma I 
7S-45c-«. l W < i a i a g i pending elsewhere • 
Jurisdiction not exercised - laqaJry to other state 
• Infsrsnaaaa exchange • Stay of proceeding I 
• a notice af another proceeding. I 
(1) A coast of this state shall not exercise its jur- I 
itchamo wader this Met if at the time of filing the I 
petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the I 
child was landing in a court of another state exer- I 
cising jurieetction substantially in conformity with I 
this act, unless the proceeding is staved by the court 
of the other state because this state is a more appr-
opriate fotaaa or for other reasons. I 
(2) Befoae hearing the petition in a custody proc- I 
ceding the court shall examine the pleadings and I 
other infonnation supplied by the parties under I 
section 7*-45c-10 and shall consult the child 
custody segistry established under section 78-4Sc- I 
16 conccsaang the pendency of proceedings with I 
respect to the child in other states. If the court has 
reason to believe that proceedings may be pending 
in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the state 
court adnamistrator or other appropriate official of 
the other state. 
(3) If the coun is informed during the course of 
the proceeding that a proceeding concerning the 
custody of the child was pending in another state 
before the court assumed jurisdiction it shall stay 
the proceeding and communicate with the court in 
which the other proceeding is pending to the end 
that the issue may be litigated in the more approp-
riate forum and that information be exchanged in 
accordance with sections 78~45c-19 through 78-
45c-22 If a court of this state has made a custody 
decree before being informed of a pending procee-
ding in a court of another state it shall immediately 
inform that court of the fact. If the court is info-
rmed thai a proceeding was commenced in another 
state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise 
inform the other court to the end that the issues 
may be litigated in the more appropriate forum, MM 
7t-45c-7. Declining Jnrlamrttaa oa finding of 
tncoaveakot fonua • Factors la deterauaatioa 
- Comaaafeatioa with other eoart - Awarding 
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act 
to make an initial or modification decree may 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before 
making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient 
fonun to make a custody determination under the 
circumstances of the case and that a court of 
another sute is a more appropriate fonun. 
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made 
upon the court's own motion or upon motion of a 
party or a guardian ad litem or other representative 
of the child. 
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, 
the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the 
child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this 
purpose it may take into account the following 
factors, among others: 
(a) If another state is or recently was the child's 
home state; 
(b) If another state has a closer connection with 
the child and his family or with the child and one or 
more of the contestants; 
(c) If substantial evidence concerning the 
child's present or future care, protection, training, 
and personal relationships is more readily available 
in another state; 
(d) If the parties have agreed on another forum 
which U no kas appropriate; and 
(e) If the exerdse of jurisdiction by a court of 
this state would contravene any of the purposes 
stated in section 78-45c-l. 
(4) Before detennining whether to decline or 
retain jurisdiction the court may communicate with 
a court of another state and exchange information 
pertinent to the assumption of jurisdiction by either 
court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction wffl 
be exercised by the more appropriate court and that 
a forum will be available to the parties. 
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient 
forum and that a court of another state is a more 
appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, 
or it may stay the proceedings upon condition that a 
custody proceeding be promptly commenced » 
another named state or upon any other c o n d i t | 0 ! f 
which may be just and proper, including the condi-
tion that a moving party stipulate his consent and 
submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum. 
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdic-
tion under this act if a custody determination •» 
incidental to an action for divorce or another proc-
eeding while retaining jurisdiction over the divorce 
or other proceeding. 
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(7) if it appears to the court that it is clearly an 
inappropriate forum it may require the party who 
commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to 
the costs of the proceedings in this state, necessary 
travel and other expenses, including attorney's fees, 
incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment 
is to be made to the clerk of the court for remitt-
ance to the proper party. 
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under 
this section the court shall inform the court found 
to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if 
the court which would have jurisdiction in the other 
state is not certainly known, shall transmit the inf-
ormation to the court administrator or other appr-
opriate official for forwarding to the appropriate 
court. 
(9) Any communication received from another 
sute informing this sute of a finding of inconven-
ient forum because a court of this sute is the more 
appropriate forum shall be filed in the custody reg-
istry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming juri-
sdiction the court of this sute shall inform the ori-
ginal court of this fact. MM 
78-45c-S. Misconduct of petitioner as basis for 
refusing Jurisdiction - Notice to another 
Jurisdiction - Ordering petitioner to appear in 
other court or to return child • Awarding costs. 
(1) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wro-
ngfully taken the child from another state or has 
engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court 
may decline to exercise jurisdiction for purposes of 
adjudication of custody if this is just and proper 
under the circumstances. 
(2) Unless required in the interest of the child, the 
court shall not exercise its jurisdiction to modify a 
custody decree of another sute if the petitioner, 
without consent of the person entitled to custody 
has improperly removed the child from the physical 
custody of the person entitled to custody or has 
improperly retained the child after a visit or other 
temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the 
petitioner has violated any other provision of a 
custody decree of another state the court may 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this u just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
(3) Where the court declines to exercise jurisdic-
tion upon petition for an initial custody decree 
pursuant to subsection (1), the court shall notify the 
parent or other appropriate person and the prosec-
uting attorney of the appropriate jurisdiction in the 
other sute. If a request to that effect is received 
from the other sute, the court shall order the peti-
tioner to appear with the child in a custody procee-
ding instituted in the other sute La accordance with 
•action 78-45c-20. If no such request is made 
•ithin a reasonable time after such notification, the 
court may entertain a petition to determine custody 
by the petitioner if it has jurisdiction pursuant to 
•ection 78-45C-2. 
(4) Where the court refuses to assume jurisdiction 
1 0
 modify the custody decree of another sute purs-
uant to subsection (2) or pursuant to section 78-
4
* H 4 , the court shall notify the person who has 
*tal custody under the decree of the other sute and i 
*•* prosecuting attorney of the appropriate jurisdi- I 
ctioti in the other sute and may order the petitioner 
** return the child to the person who has legal 
^ o d y . If it appears that the order wiU be ineffe-
***** and the legal custodian u ready to receive the 
* " d within a period of a few days, the court may j 
"*ct the child in a foster care home for such 
Uf^od, pending return of the child to the legal cus-
& ? » C o 
" * * Uak 
I Code 78-45c-lL 
lodian. At the same time, the court shall advise the 
petitioner that any petition for modification of 
custody must be directed to the appropriate court oj 
the other sute which has continuing jurisdiction, or. 
in the event that that court declines jurisdiction, to * 
court in a sute which has jurisdiction pursuant i© 
section 78-45c-3. 
(5) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a pet-
ition under this section may charge the petitioner 
with necessary travel and other expenses, indudi&{ 
attorney's fees and the cost of returning the child to 
another sute. r*w 
78-45c-9. Information as to custody of child and 
litigation concerning required la pleadings -
Verification • Continuing duty lo inform court. 
(1) Every party in a custody proceeding in his fire 
pleading or in an affidavit attached to that pleading 
shall give information under oath as to the child'i 
present address, the places where the child has bvec 
within the last five years, and the names and prcsetr 
addresses of the persons with whom the child h*j 
lived during that period. In this pleading or affidavc 
every party shall further declare under oath as to 
each of the following whether: 
(a) He has participated, as a party, witness, or 
in any other capacity, in any other litigation conce-
rning the custody of the same child in this or am 
other sute; 
(b) He has infonnation of any custody procee-
ding concerning the child pending in a court of th& 
or any other sute; and 
(c) He knows of any person not a party to tie 
proceedings who has physical custody of the child or 
claims to have custody or visitation rights wet 
respect to the child. 
(2) If the declaration as to any of the above items 
is in the affirmative the declarant shall gtve addm-
onal information under oath as required by the 
court. The court may examine the parties under 
oath as to details of the information furnished mot 
as to other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdi-
ction and the disposition of the case. 
(3) Each party has a continuing duty to infant 
the court of any custody proceeding concerning tfat 
child in this or any other sute of which he obtained 
information during this proceeding. » n 
7t-45c-10. Joinder of persons having custody or 
claiming custody or vtsiution rights. 
If the court learns from information furnished fcj 
the parties pursuant to section 78-45c-9 or from 
other sources that a person not a party to rht 
custody proceeding has physical custody of the chut 
or claims to have custody or visiution rights wift 
respect to the child, it shall order that person to fct 
joined as a party and to be duly notified of ire 
pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder as « 
party. If the person joined as a party is outside ttra 
state he shall be served with process or otherwMe 
notified m accordance with section 78-4Sc-S. tm 
7S-45c.ll. Ordering party to appear -
Eafofcesaeat • Oat-of-state party - Travel 
expense. 
(I) The court may order any party to the proces-
ding who is in this sute to appear personally before 
the court If that party has physical custody of the 
child the court may order that he appear personal* 
with the child. If the party who is ordered to appear 
with the child cannot be served or fails to obey tte 
order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, tie 
court may issue a warrant of arrest against sua 
party to secure his appearance with the child. 




(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is 
desired by the court is outside this state with or 
without the child the court may order that the notice 
given under section 78-4Sc-S include a statement I 
directing that party to appear personally with or 
without the child and declaring that failure to 
appear may result in a decision adverse to that 
party. 
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this I 
state is directed to appear under subsection (2) or I 
desires to appear personally before the court with or I 
without the child, the court may require another I 
party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and ( 
other necessary expenses of the party so appearing 
and of the child if this is just and proper under the I 
circumstances. MM J 
7t-45c-12. rmrUes bound by custody decree • 
Conducive unless atodifted. 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state I 
which had jurisdiction under section 78-45c-3, ] 
binds all parties who have been served in this state 
or notified in accordance with section 78-45c-5 or 
who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, 
and who have been given an opportunity to be 
heard. As to these parties the custody decree is 
conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided 
and as to the custody determination made unless 
and until that determination is modified pursuant to j 
law, including the provisions of this act. net 
7t-45c-l3. atecoguitioa aad eaforceaseat of 
foreign decrees. 
The courts of this state shall recognize and 
enforce an initial or modification decree of a court 
of another state which had assumed jurisdiction 
under statutory provisions substantially in accord-
ance with this act or which was made under factual 
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of 
the act. so long as this decree has not been modified 
in accordance with jurisdictional standards substa-
ntially siaailar to those of this act. t«*» 
78-45c-14. Modification of foreign decree -
Pimsjntiites • Factors considered. 
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody 
decree, a court of this state shall not modify that • 
decree —leu (a) it appears to the court of this state 
that the court which rendered the decree does not 
now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequ-
isites substantially in accordance with this act or has 
declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree 
and (b> the court of this state has jurisdiction. 
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under ' 
subsection (1) and section 78-45c-8 to modify a 
custody decree of another state it shall give due 
consideration to the transcript of the record and 
other documents of all previous proceedings subm-
itted to it in accordance with section 78-45c-22. 
7t-45c-15. Filing foreign decree - Effect • " * 
Enfnaveaseat - Award of expenses. 
(1) A certified copy of a custody decree of 
another state may be filed in the office of the clerk 
of any district court of this state. The clerk shall 
treat the decree in the same manner as a custody 
decree o f the district court of this state. A custody 
decree so filed has the same effect and shall be 
enforced in like manner as a custody decree rend-
ered by a court of this state. 
(2) A person violating a custody decree of another 
state which makes it necessary to enforce the decree 
in this state may be required to pay necessary travel 
and other expenses, including attorney's fees, inc-
urred by the party entitled to the custody or his 
3 6 8 For AnnoUt ions , consult 
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78-45c-16. Registry maintained by clerk of court 
• Documents entered. 
The clerk of each district court shall maintain a 
registry in which he shall enter all of the following: 
(1) Certified copies of custody decrees of other 
states received for filing; 
(2) Communications as to the pendency of 
custody proceedings in other states; 
(3) Communications concerning a finding of inc-
onvenient forum by a court of another state; and 
(4) Other communications or documents concer-
ning custody proceedings in another state which may 
affect the jurisdiction of a court of this state or the 
disposition to be made by it in a custody procee-
ding. H« 
78-45C-17. Certified copies of decrees furnished 
by derlc of court. 
The clerk of a district court of this state, at the 
request of the court of another state or at the 
request of any person who is affected by or has a 
I legitimate interest in a custody decree, shall certify 
and forward a copy of the decree to that court or 
person. Hat 
7I-4SC-1I. Taking testimony of persons in other 
states. 
In addition to other procedural devices available 
to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guar-
dian ad litem or other representative of the child 
I may adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties 
I and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another 
I state. The court on its own motion may direct that 
the testimony of a person be taken in another state 
I and may prescribe the manner in which and the 
I terms upon which the testimony shall be taken. HSS 
I 7f-4$c-19. Request to court of another state to 
I take evidence, to make studies or to order 
I appearance of party - Payment of costs. 
I (1) A court of this state may request the approp-
I riate court of another state to hold a hearing to 
I adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give 
I evidence under other procedures of that state, or to 
I have social studies made with respect to the custody 
of a child involved in proceedings pending in the 
court of this state; and to forward to the court of 
this state certified copies of the transcript of the 
record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise 
adduced, or any social studies prepared in compli-
ance with the request. The cost of the services may ; 
be assessed against the parties. 
(2) A court of this state may request the approp-
riate court of another state to order a party to 
custody proceedings pending in the court of this 
state to appear in the proceedings, and if that party 
has physical custody of the child, to appear with the 
[ child. The request may state that travel and other 
necessary expenses of the party and of the chUd > 
whose appearance is desired will be assessed against 
another party or will otherwise be paid. tstt 
7t-45c-M. Taking evidence for use In court of 
another state • Ordering appearance In another 
state • Enfofceatent - Costs. 
(1) Upon request of the court of another state the 
J courts of this state which are competent to hear -
I custody matters may order a person in this state to 
I appear at a hearing to adduce evidence or to 
J produce or give evidence under other procedures 
I available in this state. A certified copy of the trsa-
I script of the record of the hearing or the e v*<*^f 
otherwise adduced shall be forwarded by the cterK 
I of the court to the requesting court. 
I D E O C O ' S Annotat ion Service 
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(2) A person within this state may voluntarily give 
pis testimony or statement in this state for use in a 
custody proceeding outside this state. 
(3) Upon request of the court of another sUte a 
competent court of this state may order a person in 
this state to appear alone or with the child in a 
custody proceeding in another state. The court may 
condition compliance with the request upon assur-
ance by the other state that travel and other neces-
sary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the 
person who has physical custody of the child cannot 
be served of fails to obey the order, or it appears 
the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a 
warrant of arrest against such person to secure bis 
appearance with the child in the other state. t«* 
7t-45c-21. Preservation of records of proceedings 
• Famishing copies to other state courts. 
In any custody proceeding in this state the court 
shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any 
record that has been made of iu hearings, social 
studies, and other pertinent documents until the 
child reaches 18 years of age. Upon appropriate 
request of the court of another state the court shall 
forward to the other court certified copies of any or 
all of such documents. MM 
7t-45c-22. Requesting court records from another 
state. 
If a custody decree has been rendered in another 
state concerning a child involved in a custody pro-
ceeding pending in a court of this state, the court of 
this sute upon taking jurisdiction of the case shall 
request of the court of the other state a certified 
copy of the transcript of any court record and other 
documents mentioned in section 78-45c-21. us* 
7t-45c-23. Foreign countries • Application of 
general policies. 
The general policies of this act extend to the int-
ernational area. The provisions of this act relating 
to the recognition and enforcement of custody 
decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and 
decrees involving legal institutions similar in nature 
to custody rendered by appropriate authorities of 
other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard were given to all affected persons. was 
7*-45c-24. Priority on court calendar. 
Upon the request of a party to a custody procee-
ding which raises a question of existence or exercise 
of jurisdiction under this act the case shall be given 
calendar priority and handled expeditiously. MM 
7t-45c-25. Notices • Orders to appear -
Manner of service. 
(1) Whenever the terms of this act impose a duty 
npon the court to notify a party or court of a part-
icuiar fact or action, such notification may be ace-
oaplished by the clerk of the court or a party to the 
action upon order of the court. 
(2) Orders of the court for parties or persons to 
•Ppear before the court in accordance with the 
' terms of this act shall include legal and sufficient 
•trvice of process in accordance with the Utah Rules 
•f Civil Procedure unless otherwise ordered for 
tood cause shown. m» 
*-4Sc-2d. Short title. 
This act may be cited as the "Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act." tsst 
Chapter 45d. Mandatory Income 
Withholding for Child Support 
71454-2. FroviaJoa for lacoaw a Has I HI U la cMM 
rapport oraor. 
7S-4S4-3. t^acoaara for •Migce awkiag I K O M 
7S-S54-4. Office pnetdmit for I M M wttaaoktta* -
Nonce to oaagor - Opaortaalty for acartag - A*©** 
- Payawat of oreraae catta soap art any aoi a* aafe 
7S-454-S. Nonce to payor. 
7S-4S4-*. Payor's arocoiar* (or lacoaw wttaaoMlag 
7S-454-7. Ternuaanoa of lacoaw wtuUMMtag-
7S-454-*. Payor's cowpaaact wtta lacoaw wtlaaoldim 
7g-4S4*lt. Priority of aoffcc to wfcaaoM iacoaar. 
7 *454 -11 . lacoaw wHaaoMiag rtgaralMM of ntUtmtt of 
cMM or state la watch order tatcroi • Goveraiac law. 
7S-4S4-12. Records . W 4 
7*454-13. lacoi 
7g-45d-l. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Child" means a son or daughter who is under 
the age of 18 years, or who is physically or mentally 
handicapped and incapable of earning income suff-
icient to support himself. 
(2) "Child support" means a financial obligation 
ordered by a court or administrative body for the 
support of a child, including current periodic pay-
ments and all arrearages. Child support includes 
court ordered obligations for the support of a 
spouse or former spouse with whom the child 
resides, if the spousal support is collected with the 
child support. 
(3) "Child support order" means a judgment, 
decree, or order of a court or administrative body 
whether interlocutory or final, whether or not pro-
spectively or retroactively modifiable, whether inci-
dental to a proceeding for divorce, judicial or legal 
separation, separate maintenance, paterniry, guard-
ianship, civil protection, or otherwise, which: 
(a) establishes or modifies child support; 
(b) reduces child support arrearages to judg-
(c) establishes child support or confirms a chfld 
support order under Chapter 31, Title 77. 
(4) "Delinquent' or "delinquency' means that 
child support in an amount at least equal to current 
child support payable for one month is overdue. 
(5) 'Department* means the Department of Social 
Services. 
(6") "Income" means earnings or compensation for 
personal services whether denominated as wages, 
salary, commission, bonus, contract payment, or 
otherwise, including gam derived from caxatai 
assets, periodic payments made under pension pro-
grams, retirement programs, or insurance policies, 
and unemployment compensation insurance benefit* 
(7) "Jurisdiction" means a state or poitical sab-
division, a territory or possession of the United 
States, the District of Columbia, or the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. 
(«) "Obligor" means a person owing a duty of 
child support. 
(?) "Obligee" means a person or entity entitled to 
receive child support, including an agency of this or 
another jurisdiction. 
(10) "Office" means the Office of Recovery Ser 
vices. 
(11) "Payor" means an employer or any persoo 
whx>U a source of income to an obligor. tm 
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EXHIBIT "A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 16868 
The plaintiff has filed a motion for change of jurisdiction 
to King County in the State of Washington, which motion is denied, 
since Washington has declined to take jurisdiction. Plaintifffs 
Motion for dismissal of defendant's Order To Show. Cause will be 
denied. Request for continuance will be granted to the extent that 
the December 30th, 1985 hearing will be vacated and set at the furtn 
convenience of the court. Plaintiff's motion for disqualification o 
the Judge will be denied, the Judge indicating by his statement and 
order that he is not communicating with defendant and Judge Call is 
qualified to hear any further action. 
DATED: 23 December 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
UiMi 
VENOY /CHRISTOFF ER6EN-, 5ISTRICT Jl 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
// ! • 
Copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision mailed this 'JQ-~#c-
of December 1985, to Stephen W. Jewell, Attorney for Plaintiff, Jam< 
-2-
C. Jenkins & Associates, 67 East 100 North, P. 0. Box 3700, Logan 
Utah 84321 and to Mark D. Weiner, Pro Se, 665 South 700 West, 
Brigham City, Utah 84302. 
Jay R. Hirschi 
Box Elder County Clerk 
He 
Deputy 
J A M I 8 RF.C'3 
EXHIBIT *'B' 












Petitioner's motion for determination of jurisdiction and 
communication with Box Elder County District Court having duly 
and regularly come on for hearing, the same being referred to 
the undersigned commissioner who had presided over contemporane 
ous Juvenile Court proceedings concerning the custody of the 
children subject of this proceeding and retained jurisdiction 
therein; the court having further communicated with the appropi 
ate judge of Bex Elder County District Court; now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this court 
finds that the custody and visitation of the children subject 1 
this proceeding has also been subject to the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Box Elder County District Court of the Stat 
of Utah; that said court acquired jurisdiction over the parties 
and the subject matter several years ago and has continuously, 
exercised jurisdiction in enforcement and modification proceed-
ings; and that one of the named parties, father of the childrei 
ORDER - 1 A r 
ry. X.'i ^'-'- -
continues to reside in the State of Utah; that upon communica-
tion with said court it has elected and determined to continue 
exercising sole and exclusive child custody jurisdiction; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (RCW 26.27) it is determined that Box 
Elder County District Court of the State of Utah continues to 
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the custody and 
visitation of the parties1 children, the parties not having 
agreed to litigate exclusively in the State of Washington and 
there being no emergency justifying intervention in the matter 
by Washington Courts; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all Washington proceedings con-
cerning the custody of said children are hereby stayed until 
further order of the court or until an appropriate motion for 
dismissal proceedings is filed and granted; and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the courts of Washington and this 
proceeding shall remain open for enforcement provisions of such 
orders as have been and may be entered by the Box Elder County 
District Court of the State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of 
the UCCJA. 
Dated and signed in open this / ^ of January, 1986 
Stephen Caddis 
STEPHEN M. GADDIS, COURT COMMISSIONER 
ORDER - 2 
• n .. . ; -i. ' v-* • . n 
St.'ATr'..r" •.VA.S'-iNi'; O N 9d 
January 13, 1985 
Venoy Christofferson 
District Court Judge 
Box Elder County District Court 
Box Elder County Courthouse 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Re: Rawlings v. Weiner 
King County Cause No. 85-3-04844-3 
Dear Judge Christofferson: 
Pursuant to my communication with your court in December, 1985, I 
have drafted and entered the original of the enclosed order. At 
this time I do not know what further steps will be requested of 
the Washington court, but yould appreciate your forwarding to the 
clerk of our court copies further substantive orders or decrees 
as may be entered in Utah respecting this family. 
SMG/jl 
cc: Mark Weiner 




r ,-\ !M *;• r. I C Q -
OCT 2 3 11 
Stephen W. Jewell 3814 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
First Security Bldg., Third Floor 
15 South Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
WENDY MARIE CHRISTENSEN * 
RAWLINGS, ORDER ON ORDER TO 
* SHOW CAUSE 
Plaintiff, 
* 
vs. Civil No. 16868 
MARK DOUGLAS WEINER, 
* 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on May 21, 22, and 26, 1986, the Honorable Omer J. Call 
presiding. The Plaintiff appeared personally and by and 
through her attorney, Stephen W. Jewell. The Defendant 
appeared personally. The Court having heard sworn testimony 
and evidence and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein 
and the Exhibits presented, including the information from the 
Washington Shelter Care proceedings, and having heard the 
arguments of Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant, and having 
heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the 
following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
RAWLINGS OTSC 
1. Plaintiff shall be and is hereby held in contempt of 
Court for failing to comply with the previous order of the 
Court to discontinue the use of the Rawlings name for the 
children. 
2. The name of the children is Weiner and there shall 
be no use by the Plaintiff of the Rawlings' name as the last 
name of the children, either, for scjiool records, .medical , /J , r+^ 
records, or otherwise. j^^UiL^, yv^te-rttd* ^c rH^<-* riU ,w-*^ LC>4U~*^ W ^ > 
cgr 3. The reports of Dx-w4nDjLptX^ljunjyAU-'!|!*?^ Dr. Jack \J*^bs J 
Reiter shall be presented to all current mental health care 
providers for their review and consideration. 
4. Counseling and therapy as ordered by this Court and 
by tne Washington Court shall be resumed with Dr. Marilyn 
Esneiman or such otner qualified mental health care provider 
as determined by Plaintiff and therapy shall be continued with 
Dr. Tom Fairbank for Defendant. The Court specifically orders 
that once said mental health care provider is selected by 
Plaintiff, there shall be no change of therapists without an 
order of the Court. Therapy will continue until terminated by 
the Court on the recommendation of the therapists. Should the 
therapist become unavailable or desire to terminate the 
relationship, Plaintiff shall immediately thereafter petition 
the Court for removal thereof and appointment of another 
mental health therapist. 
2 
5. All mail sent by Defendant or Plaintiff to the 
children shall be received by Plaintiff or Defendant and 
delivered/\to the children, whether said mail is sent first 
class or registered. 
6. Each party shall provide the other party and the 
Court with a current and regularly updated home phone number 
and address. During visitation, Defendant shall reasonably 
inform Plaintiff of the whereabouts of the children and shall 
provide an address and telephone number where the children can 
be reached. 
7. There shall be no monitoring of telephone calls or 
*/£lu^«'* other recording of conversations or video taping 
8. It is the order of the Court that telephone 
conversations need be no longer than ten (10) to twenty (20) 
minutes long, J 
9. Legal custody of the minor children of the parties 
shall be jointly vested in each of the parties, with Plaintiff 
being granted primary physical custody of the children with 
visitation to Defendant as herein provided. 
10. Defendant shall be granted visitation with the 
children as follows, recognizing that visitation is for the 
chidren, and their needs are of primary importance in 
determining visitation arrangements: 
A. During the children's school summer vacation. 
Defendant shall be entitled to six (6) continuous 
iU^ 
weeks. For 1986 said visitation shall begin.on 
June 22 for six <6) weeksM' on June 29 for six 
(6) weeks/Non July 6 for six (6) weeks, or on 
July 13 for six (6) weeks at the discretion of 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff shall notify the Defendant 
June 1, 1986, by registered mail, when said 
visitation shall begin, and on each year 
thereafter on or before June 1. Said 
visitation to be scheduled in future years 
shall substantially comply with the order 
as as stated above. Saidjsixj 6) weeks 
visitation shall begin vim may ynt 5:00 p.m., 
and continue for six (6) weeks to the sixth 
SpES^t at 5:00 p.m. 
During said six <6) week visitation, Plaintiff 
shall be granted at least weekly telephone 
conversations with each of the children and 
shall be allowed visitation for at least two 
(2) weekends, beginning Friday at 5:00 p.m., 
to Sunday at 5:00 p.m. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the visitation schedule on or 
before June 1, 1986, and subsequent years, by 
registered mail. Said visitation may be 
exercised by Plaintiff 
^ 
i, and the children 
shall be picked up and returned to St&&mmm 
S^Efey*- with no other restrictions except as 
stated herein. 
tU v#*"i *rj v»*~ 
Defendant shall be allowed further visitation 
of four to five <4 to 5) days during the 
children's school Easter vacation in the 
spring and three to four <3 to 4) days during 
October or November as is allowed by the 
children's school vacation as scheduled, not 
to include Thanksgiving. Plaintiff shall notify 
Defendant of the dates and times such visitation 
shall take place by registered mail at least 
sixty (60) days prior to said visitation, or 
when the school schedule is available. Said 
visitation shall in no way interfere with 
regularly scheduled school. 
Thanksgiving and Christmas visitation shall 
continue as provided in previous orders of the 
Court. 
4 
11. Travel expenses for all visitation, including 
picking up the children in Washington and returning them to 
Washington for the summer visitation, shall be the 
responsibility of Defendant. Defendant shall be entitled to 
deduct from child support payments a total of $300.00 per year 
for all visitation and travel expenses. If Plaintiff delivers 
the children to Brigham City and picks up the children from 
Brigham City for any visitation. Defendant shall be entitled 
to deduct only $200.00 for total travel expenses rather than 
$300.00. Defendant shall continue to be allowed to reduce 
child support obligations by $400.00 during summer visitation. 
12. There shall be no other changes in child support 
paid by Defendant except as ordered for travel expenses. 
13. All repeated conflict and emotional distress and 
strain shall be discontinued by the parties. 
14. No police officers or other individuals shall 
intervene or otherwise be used to force compliance with this 
order. Washington Social Services or such other qualified 
agency shall be allowed to assist in compelling compliance of 
the Court order if deemed reasonably necessary by such agency 
after a proper review. The Court will allow reasonable 
exclusions from visitation for illness if any such child is 
isolated because of said illness or upon a doctor's 
certification. 
5 
1 5 . D e f e n d a n t '-ilia I I c u n t LIIUM t" U be r e s p o n s i b l e J o r a n d 
m a i n t a i n : ;ea .* . .. . s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e f o r t h e c h i l d r e n . it: 
Pla ; : - • .f: a e s i r e s t o o D t a m m e d i c nil IIIHII n i »•' rim I 11 i - i d e 
i n s u r a n c e ? a n d h e a l t h c a r e c o v e r a g e , P 1 di.ii L i I i in a J 111;. wv, J t o 
o r c v i d e * .- ^ *• . wn e x p e n s e . If" P l a i n t i f f s o e l e c t s , , 
i i t i n mi i II I h e i !; M Il il  I I I I in III III I in i l l y I in HI J 
. e i e n a a n e r e a i t e r be r e l i e v e d o.t f u r t h e r du ty and 
o d i i g a 1 - ; * - - * . , « - n e d i t h JLIISU- *' * r medical, c o v e r a g e . 
^^ p a r t i e s ahal. I be a l l o w e d t o r e c o v e r 
r c r *-£* • x o e n s e s t h i s a c t i o n , w h e t h e r t r a v e l , 
mnri i ""*ni I I r ij m I inn nit hnnr 'ii i m IIIIIMI I III III | I III 1 iilni I I In 11 hi i u i u 
h e r Dwn c o s t s arid e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d m t i n s a c t i o n ami p r i o i 
h e r e t o . 
' pr requests and motions of Defendant except 
as nereir i p e d i c a i . / provided shall be and are hereby 
c :!e 
.^w. A1! ^4-u^^ -rders of the Court as previously entered 
and * T.cdj-f j.e*-i ^x order shall stand as otherwise 
F i :•. d . 
j 
/ 
DATED this /• ' rlav of •' ^•</''\ - 'ZP 19S6. 
Confirmed copies mailed this date 
to Stephen W. Jewell and Mark 
D Weiner by 
/ >?^W t£, 7/c 
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